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1. Aspect in Idiomatic Constructions
It has been claimed in the Distributed Morphology framework that aspectuality of
verbal phrases cannot be altered in idiomatic contexts (Marantz 1997, McGinnis
2002, 2005). For example, McGinnis (2002:667) points out that it should not be
surprising that the following idiomatic examples in (1), which are representative
of the familiar Vendlerian classes turn out to preserve the aspectuality associated
to their literal interpretations:
(1) a. States (have bigger fish to fry; take the cake)
b. Activities (beat around the bush; push one’s luck)
c. Accomplishments (run X into the ground; climb the ladder of success)
d. Achievements (drop the ball; kick the bucket)
McGinnis (2005:9) goes further by claiming that “there is still no evidence that an 
idiomatic phrase can have an aspectual interpretation that is incompatible with its 
syntactic structure”.  
In this paper, we take issue with this radical position by showing how meta-
phor can change the aspectual interpretation “compatible with its syntactic 
structure”. In order to show this, we will be using some interesting examples that 
fall into the class described as fake resultatives by Jackendoff (1997, 2002) and 
Glasbey (2003, 2005). Interestingly, these authors have pointed out that these 
constructions have an aspectual reading different from true resultatives: for 
example, compare the telic resultative constructions in (2), associated to literal 
eventualities, with the atelic ones in (3), associated to idiomatic ones.  
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(2)  a. The audience laughed the actor off the stage in/*for ten seconds. 
  b. She worked the splinter out of her finger in/*for ten seconds. 
 
(3)  a. John laughed his butt off all day long/*in ten minutes.  
       b. John worked his guts out all day long/*in ten minutes. 
  
The main goal of this paper is to show that fake resultatives can be conceptually 
associated with durative activities, not because of Jackendoff’s (1997, 2002) or 
Glasbey’s (2003, 2005) lexical stipulations (see section 2), but rather because of 
regular metaphorical modes of thought that are dynamically activated in the 
process of idiom comprehension (Gibbs 1994, 1995, Lakoff 1993, Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999). In particular, as shown in section 3, we claim that the atelic 
interpretation is driven by the activation of the complex metaphor AN INTENSE 
ACTIVITY IS AN EXCESSIVE DETACHMENT OF A BODY PART, which is 
a subcase of AN INTENSE ACTIVITY IS AN EXCESSIVE CAUSED 
CHANGE OF LOCATION/STATE. 
 
2.  Two Accounts of Fake Resultatives 
In this section, we review two previous accounts that assume that the aspectual 
meaning (in particular, the atelic or process interpretation) drawn from the semi-
idiomatic constructions in (3) follows from or relates to some unmotivated lexical 
stipulations: see Jackendoff (1997, 2002) and Glasbey (2003), respectively. We 
hold that idioms cannot be simply taken as non-compositional, and idiosyncratic. 
Rather we assume that their linguistic interpretation is no different from that of 
non-idiomatic constructions, and – in order to account for the atelic interpretation 
involved in apparent resultative constructions like those in (3) – we put forward 
the hypothesis (cf. Mateu and Espinal 2007) that the interpretation ‘to excess’ is 
obtained at the output of various metaphorical and metonymic conceptual 
processes that apply non-systematically in idiom comprehension (Gibbs 1995). 
Accordingly, the relevant point is not whether the supposed stipulation (or 
convention, as we prefer to call it here) exists, but rather whether it can be moti-
vated or not. In contrast to Jackendoff’s and Glasbey’s unmotivated analyses, we 
will show that the relevant motivation whereby an atelic interpretation is involved 
in (3) is to be related to Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999) theory of conceptual meta-
phors (see section 3). 
 
2.1. Jackendoff (1997, 2002) 
According to Jackendoff, the idioms in (3) form a class of constructional idioms 
(CI), in the sense that they show a syntactic configuration whose structure con-
tributes semantic content above and beyond that contained in the constituent 
lexical items. More specifically, he claims that the data in (3) instantiates a family 
of idiomatic intensifiers that use the same syntax as the resultative. In other 
words, this class of CI corresponds to an idiomatic specialization of the resultative 
construction.  
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In particular, he claims that the constructions in (3) are listed in the lexicon as 
VP idioms: see (4) and (5) for his informal representations, drawn from Jackend-
off (1997:554) and Jackendoff (2002:173), respectively. The construction itself 
has a VP syntactic structure in which the NP + PRT are lexically fixed, and the V 
is a free variable. At the level of conceptual structure the schemas in (4a) and (5a) 
are claimed to be interpreted with an intensive adverbial force (i.e., intensely, 
excessively), associated with the action denoted by the verb. The NP plus the 
particles out/off form a class of idiomatic intensifiers that, somewhat unexpect-
edly, do not carry typical resultative semantics. Crucially, notice that the associa-
tion between the syntactic part in (4a)/(5a) and the interpretive one in (4b)/(5b) is 
merely stipulated, and no motivation is provided for such a stipulation.  
 
(4)  a. [VP V [bound pronoun]’s head off]  
b. ‘V intensely’      
              
(5)  a. [VP  V NP PRT]: V proe’s head / butt off, V proe’s heart out  
b. ‘V excessively’ 
 
Adopting Jackendoff’s (2002) Parallel Architecture framework, Cappelle 
(2005:48) provides a more formal representation in (6). In particular, notice that 
the Jackendovian semantic/conceptual representation in (6b) contains a Degree 
expression which is directly associated to the NP and Prt via two subindices: 6+2, 
respectively. Indeed, we will argue that such a direct association prevents the 
relevant motivation from being properly captured.      
 
(6)  a. Syntactic structure 
         S3 
 
     NP4          VP 
 
         
         V5  NP6    Prt2 
 
       
              Pro4      N1 
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b. Semantic (conceptual) structure 
 Event3 
 
 
    Object4       Y5      Degree6+2 
 
 
         X     EXCESSIVELY 
 
More interestingly, Jackendoff (1997:552) points out that a class of fake reflexive 
resultatives exists in English that show a similar intensive adverbial force, linguis-
tically expressed by means of an AP or a PP that idiomatically mean excessively:  
 
(7)  a. Dean laughed/danced himself crazy/silly. 
  b. Dean laughed/danced himself to death/to oblivion.  
        
Concerning the aspectual meaning involved in (7), Jackendoff (1997:552) makes 
the interesting observation that “the expressions with crazy and silly can be used 
telically or atelically; those with to prefer to be telic”: cf. (8). In contrast, he 
points out (Jackendoff 1997:551) that the abovementioned expressions with 
out/off-particles (as well as the V up a storm construction) can only be interpreted 
with an atelic reading: cf. (9). 
 
(8)  a. Dean laughed/danced himself crazy/silly for/in an hour. 
  b. Dean laughed/danced himself to death/to oblivion in/??for an hour. 
       
(9)  a. Sue worked her butt off for/*in an hour. 
b. Harry cooked up a storm for/*in an hour. 
c. The frog sang his heart out for the whole night/*in a night. 
 
To sum up, it is important to notice that under Jackendoff’s architecture a con-
structional idiom is a special kind of phrasal lexical item, whose meaning is 
learnable in the same way word meanings are learned; therefore, the fact that 
different phrases that idiomatically mean intensely/excessively have different 
aspectualities must be attributed to the fact that SS-CS correspondences have to 
stipulate when a given SS corresponds to a telic CS (e.g. time-away construction), 
an atelic one (e.g. V up a storm, V NP out/off), or to both (e.g. laugh himself 
silly). In section 3 we will show that the aspectual meaning of this construction is 
activated by salient conceptual metaphors. 
 
2.2.  Glasbey (2003, 2005) 
Glasbey (2003, 2005) mainly focuses on the fact that fake resultatives like those 
in (3) and (9) show non-compositionality of aspect (contra McGinnis 2002, 
2005), since the aspectual class conveyed by the idiomatic interpretation is an 
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activity, a kind of eventuality that should be contrasted with the literal interpreta-
tion, which gives rise to an accomplishment. According to her, whereas literal 
eventualities have a natural endpoint and a gradual patient, there is usually no 
gradual patient property in the idiomatic eventuality involved in (3) and (9), 
unless one can imagine such a natural end point and some homomorphism can be 
identified between the syntactic components and certain properties of the idioms’s 
components. Thus, her example in (10a) is partially accepted and can be submit-
ted to the accomplishment test in (10b), because a counterpart exists in the 
idiomatic domain (i.e. pains, feelings, thoughts, etc.) to the body part in the 
domain of literal interpration (i.e. heart). 
 
(10) a. ?Patsy poured her heart out in two hours, on the phone to her sister.     
b. It took Patsy two hours to pour her heart out, on the phone to her sister. 
 
According to Glasbey (2005:5), what is characteristic about the class of idioms 
under the present study is that it corresponds to “a construction which describes 
an accomplishment under a literal interpretation and an activity under an idio-
matic interpretation”. She claims that idioms which do not show compositionality 
of aspect, tentatively identified with Nunberg, Sag, and Wasow’s (1994) so-called 
idiomatic phrases, should best be regarded as being listed as full phrases in the 
lexicon with their aspectual information attached. Glasbey concludes that it is 
possible to view aspect as being compositional in at least some idioms (e.g. 
Nunberg, Sag, and Wasow’s idiomatically combining expressions), while at the 
same time allowing for the result of the aspectual composition to be different in 
the idiomatic and the literal cases. The problem still is that, under her approach, 
no motivation is given to the empirical fact that the idioms exemplified in (3) and 
(9) are aspectually interpreted as activities. This is merely stipulated.   
In the next section, we show that (i) Jackendoff’s (1997, 2002) observation 
that the set of idioms in (3) and (9) are interpreted as “V excessively” and (ii) 
Glasbey’s (2003, 2005) claim that they are interpreted as activities (but not as 
accomplishments) both can be motivated, if one assumes that regular metaphori-
cal modes of thought are dynamically activated in the process of idiom compre-
hension (cf. Gibbs 1994f, Lakoff and Johnson 1999, among others). 
 
3.  An Alternative Account: When Metaphor Constrains Aspect 
Before dealing with so-called fake resultatives and showing how the relevant 
metaphor involved can be argued to constrain their aspect, it will be useful to 
show how true resultatives have been analyzed within a particular cognitive 
framework that assumes Lakoff & Johnson’s theory of conceptual metaphors: for 
our present purposes, here we will be using Goldberg’s (1995) Construction 
Grammar-based informal analysis of the resultative construction (e.g., (11b)), 
which is regarded as a metaphorical extension of the so-called caused-motion 
construction (e.g., (11a)). She represents the relation between the two construc-
tions as in (12). Basically, according to Goldberg (1995:84f), the resultative 
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construction is a metaphorical extension of the central sense of the caused-motion 
construction, which is associated with the semantics “X CAUSES Y to MOVE 
Z”.   
 
(11) a. Joe kicked the bottle into the yard. 
  b. Joe kicked Bob black and blue.  
 
(12) Goldberg’s (1995:88) Construction Grammar analysis  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         IM: Change of State as Change of Location 
 
 
           
  
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice that the intervention of the well-known metaphor Changes of State are 
Changes of Location is depicted in (12) via the metaphorical extension inheri-
tance link IM.  
 
The metaphor –in this case, Change of State as Change of Location- accounts for the rela-
tion between the semantics of the two constructions. The syntactic specifications of the 
metaphorical extension are inherited from the caused-motion construction.  
(Goldberg 1995:88-89) 
 
To put it in Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999:52-53) terms, there are three primary 
metaphors involved in the resultative construction, the ones in (13).  
 
(13) a.   States are Locations 
Sem  CAUSE-MOVE   <      cause    goal          theme > 
 
  
PRED   <        > 
           
 
 
Syn     V       SUBJ        OBLPP     OBJ 
Sem  CAUSE-BECOME  <  agent   result-goal    patient > 
 
  
PRED   <        > 
           
 
 
Syn     V        SUBJ         OBLPP/AP     OBJ 
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    Subjective Judgment: A subjective state 
    Sensoriomotor Experience: Being in a bounded region of space 
Primary experience: Experiencing a certain state as correlated with 
a certain location (e.g., being cool under a tree, feeling secure in 
bed) 
 
  b.  Change is Motion 
    Subjective Judgment: Experiencing a change of state 
    Sensoriomotor Experience: Moving 
Primary experience: Experiencing the change of state that goes 
with the change of location as you move 
 
  c.  Causes are Physical Forces 
    Subjective Judgment: Achieving results   
    Sensoriomotor Experience: Exertion of force 
Primary experience: Achieving results by exerting forces on physi-
cal objects to move or change them 
 
Given this, the metaphor posited by Goldberg (1995:88) in (12) is in fact a 
combination of the two primary metaphors in (13a) and (13b). Notice moreover 
that her analysis in (12) should also be modified by positing an additional inheri-
tance link, the one having to do with the primary metaphor in (13c). In this sense, 
i.e., stricto sensu, Goldberg’s (1995) use of the abstract CAUSE predicate in the 
basic or source domain structure in (12) is not quite appropriate: the replacement 
of the term “Caused-Motion Construction” by “Forced-Motion Construction” 
seems to be more justified.        
Next consider the relevant minimal pair in (14), where the resultative con-
struction in (14b) can be seen to preserve the telic aspect of the forced-motion 
construction in (14a): 
 
(14) a. Joe laughed the audience off the stage (in/*for ten seconds)  
  b. Joe laughed himself to death/to oblivion (in/*for an hour) 
 
Indeed, the fact that those resultatives exemplified in (11b) and (14b) preserve a 
telic aspectuality follows from the more general claim alluded to by Gibbs’s 
(2003:7) that the “metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology of the 
embodied, image-shematic source domain” (cf. Lakoff’s (1990, 1993) so-called 
Invariance Hypothesis). In the present case, there is a telos (or ‘final goal’) 
involved in the source domain of the forced-motion construction (cf. (14a)) that is 
mapped onto the target domain of the resultative construction (cf. (14b)): as 
pointed out by Goldberg (1995:84), “the resultative is a metaphorically inter-
preted goal phrase”. It is then not surprising that resultative constructions are 
usually found to be telic: i.e., since forced-motion constructions are usually telic, 
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resultative constructions are predicted to be telic as well, by virtue of Lakoff’s 
(1990, 1993) Invariance Hypothesis.2
Up to now we have been dealing with the somewhat easier or more predict-
able cases: i.e., the true resultatives, which are those whose aspect is telic. Next 
consider again the more interesting cases in (3), repeated in (15).   
  
 
(15) a. John laughed his butt off all day long/*in ten minutes  
       b. John worked his guts out  all day long/*in ten minutes. 
 
It must be recalled from section 2 that two non-trivial facts must be explained 
concerning the examples in (15): not only must we account for their conceptual 
interpretation (i.e., ‘to act excessively’), but also their atelic aspect (i.e., their at 
first sight unexpected process or activity reading). Indeed, as emphasized above, 
we do not want to simply assume Jackendoff’s (1997, 2002) stipulation concern-
ing the former nor Glasbey’s (2003, 2005) one concerning the latter. Rather, we 
want to motivate both interpretations (the meaning of ‘excessively’ and the atelic 
reading), and in order to achieve this goal we will use Lakoff & Johnson’s (1999) 
theory of conceptual metaphors.  
On the other hand, although we do not provide experimental or psycholinguis-
tic evidence for our present proposal,3
To put it in the present terms, metaphor can be shown to constrain aspect in a 
non-trivial way precisely in those cases where metaphorical mappings do not 
appear to preserve the cognitive topology of the embodied, image-shematic 
source domain, i.e., in those cases where the so-called Invariance Hypothesis 
(Lakoff 1990, 1993) appears to be violated. In contrast, when dealing with “true” 
resultatives, aspectuality can be said to follow from the topology of the source 
 here we want to claim that metaphor can be 
shown to constrain aspect. This can better be shown in a non trivial way when 
dealing with the “exceptional” cases (e.g., fake resultatives), rather than when 
dealing with the usual ones (i.e., true resultatives). In fact, it should not be surpris-
ing that Glasbey’s (2003, 2005) criticism of McGinnis’s (2002, 2005) syntactico-
centric treatment of aspect is mostly based on the existence of examples like those 
in (15), since  given McGinnis’ hypothesis on the systematicity of aspect  only 
the accomplishment reading would be expected to emerge in (15), contrary to 
fact. However, as noted above, it seems to us that Glasbey’s (2005) alternative 
solution of attaching the relevant aspectual reading (an atelic one in (15)) to the 
entire idiomatic phrases in the lexicon is not explanatory enough. Rather it seems 
to us that appealing to conceptual metaphor becomes unavoidable if one wants to 
account for (and not just stipulate) their atelicity.     
                                                 
2 See Lakoff & Johnson (1999) for the claim that such a hypothesis does not have a primitive 
status in their recent theory of conceptual metaphor.  
 
3 See Gibbs (1994, 1995, i.a) for evidence showing how the meaning of idioms is metaphorically 
motivated. 
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domain: the telos (i.e., the endpoint/final goal) in the source domain is mapped 
onto another one in the target domain (cf. (14)).   
Given the previous discussion, let us try to motivate both stipulations involved 
in (15): i.e., the conceptual interpretation ‘to act excessively’ and its related atelic 
interpretation. Far from accepting the traditional claim that idioms are bearers of 
interpretive anomalies, we want to support the idea that they are conceived of as 
triggers of conceptual metaphors. In particular, the examples in (15) seem to 
involve a complex metaphor based on the well-established primary metaphor that 
conceives the body as a container, for extracting a part from this container is 
cognitively conceived of as an excessive, impossible action. This complex 
metaphor, which could be formulated as in (16), allows an interpretation accord-
ing to which the exaggeration (i.e., the meaning of ‘excessively’) that emerges at 
the physical or source domain of the body is mapped as intensity onto the abstract 
or target domain of the relevant action: that is, acting excessively is conceptually 
motivated in terms of an excessive change undergone by the subject’s body part.   
 
(16) AN INTENSE ACTIVITY IS AN EXCESSIVE DETACHMENT / 
EXHAUSTION OF A BODY PART      
 
Given this, the fact that examples like (15a) and (15b) are conceptually inter-
preted as (roughly) ‘John {laughed/worked} excessively’ is assumed to be driven 
by the activation of the complex metaphor in (16). That is to say, the intensity 
meaning in (15a) is structured by an excessive (unreal) detachment undergone by 
the butt of the subject, while the intensity meaning in (15b) is understood by 
means of an excessive (also unreal) exhaustion of the guts of the subject (e.g., 
notice that the same holds for the typical idiom to cry one’s eyes out).  
More generally, we claim that the particular complex metaphor in (16) is not 
but a subcase of the more general one represented in (17): 
 
(17) AN INTENSE ACTIVITY IS AN EXCESSIVE CAUSED CHANGE OF 
LOCATION / STATE   
 
Our claim is that it is precisely the activation of the complex metaphor in (17) that 
accounts for the durative (i.e., atelic) aspect of examples like those in (15): the 
excessive change of location structured by a bounded path (out/off) is mapped 
onto the target domain as a more abstract unbounded intensity component. In 
other words, the two activities involved in the examples in (15) are conceptual-
ized as so intense that they appear to lack boundaries; as a result of the activation 
of the complex metaphor in (17), there turns out to be no real endpoint involved 
in the final conceptual interpretation of the idiom, hence the non-resultative 
aspect of the semi-idiomatic constructions in (15).  
Furthermore, (17) can also be argued to be involved in the process of under-
standing “fake resultatives” like the one in (18a), which has a typical durative 
(i.e., atelic) interpretation and contains a subset of adjectives (i.e., crazy or silly) 
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initially conceptualized as final states of a caused change (cf. (12) above). We 
claim that the atelicity of (18a) follows from the fact that the excessive final 
endpoint/state associated to crazy/silly is conceptualized in such a way that the 
intense activity appears to lack boundaries. As above, as a result of the activation 
of the complex metaphor in (17), there turns out to be no final state involved in 
the final conceptual interpretation of the idiom, hence the typical non-resultative 
aspect of the semi-idiomatic construction in (18a).  
 
(18) a. John laughed himself crazy/silly for an hour.  
  b. (?)John laughed himself crazy/silly in an hour. 
 
On the other hand, concerning the telic interpretation in (18b), our claim is that 
the only complex metaphor involved is the typical one found in telic resultatives: 
i.e., A caused change of state is a forced motion/‘change’ of location, i.e., the 
very same one found in (11b) Joe kicked Bob black and blue or (14b) Joe laughed 
himself to death/to oblivion.  
 
4.  Concluding Remarks  
So-called “fake resultative constructions” like We laughed our heads off have 
been assigned both a somewhat unexpected atelic interpretation (Glasbey 2003, 
2005) and a conceptual meaning expressing intensity (Jackendoff 1997, 2002). 
Here we have shown that both associations must not be regarded as mere stipula-
tions, but can be accounted for by examining a metaphorical process which is not 
syntactically transparent nor compositional.  
In our previous work (e.g., Mateu & Espinal 2007), we have claimed that a 
generative approach to the compositional meaning of idiomatic constructions 
must not be regarded as incompatible with the cognitive one presented here. We 
also leave it for further research to deal with Gibbs’s (2003:14) concessive claim 
that “traditional propositional and high-dimensional approaches to semantics may 
not be entirely incompatible with an embodied meaning perspective”. For the 
time being, we are persuaded that both perspectives (the generative one and the 
cognitive one) can provide interesting insights on the syntax and semantics of 
idioms.      
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